Nothing to Declare But Their Childhood:  Reforming U.S. Asylum Law to Protect the Rights of Children by Bien, Rachel
Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 12
Issue 2
SCIENCE FOR JUDGES II:
The Practice of Epidemiology and Administrative
Agency Created Science
Article 11
2004
Nothing to Declare But Their Childhood:
Reforming U.S. Asylum Law to Protect the Rights
of Children
Rachel Bien
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Rachel Bien, Nothing to Declare But Their Childhood: Reforming U.S. Asylum Law to Protect the Rights of Children, 12 J. L. & Pol'y
(2004).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol12/iss2/11
BIENMACRO.DOC 4/23/2004 1:15 PM 
 
797 
 
NOTHING TO DECLARE BUT THEIR 
CHILDHOOD: REFORMING U.S. ASYLUM 
LAW TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF 
CHILDREN 
Rachel Bien* 
INTRODUCTION 
Bernard Lukwago was fifteen years old when rebels with the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) kicked in the door to his family 
home and murdered his parents.1 The rebels tied Lukwago’s hands 
with a rope and took him to their camp.2 At the camp, armed rebels 
held Lukwago captive in a tent with other kidnapped children.3 
The rebels told him that if he tried to escape he would be killed.4 
Lukwago witnessed the rebels kill two children who had failed in 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2005; B.A., Brown University, 2000. The 
author would like to dedicate this note to Brooklyn Law School’s Safe Harbor 
Clinic, which provides legal assistance to individuals seeking asylum in the 
United States. Special thanks to Professor Stacy Caplow for her guidance, 
support, and humor. Many thanks to the staff of the Journal of Law and Policy 
for their patience and encouragement. 
1 Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 2003). The Lord’s 
Resistance Army is an organized rebel group that has waged a brutal war against 
the Ugandan government for seventeen years. Press Release, Human Rights 
Watch, Uganda: Sharp Decline in Human Rights (July 15, 2003), at 
http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/07/uganda071503.htm. Both sides have 
committed gross human rights abuses, including murder, torture, rape, 
recruitment of children, and arbitrary detention. Id. 
2 Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 164. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
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their attempt to flee.5 The rebels trained Lukwago to shoot a gun 
and threatened to kill him if he refused to follow their orders.6 
Once trained, the rebels forced Lukwago to fight alongside other 
children on the front line against government soldiers.7 The rebels 
also forced Lukwago to accompany them on attacks against 
civilians.8 During these attacks, Lukwago witnessed the rebels 
mutilate civilians by cutting their lips and fingers.9 
Lukwago escaped from his captors while collecting firewood 
weeks after his capture.10 Carrying a false passport, Lukwago 
arrived in the United States at New York’s John F. Kennedy 
airport in November 2000.11 He immediately applied for asylum, 
based on his past persecution by the LRA.12 The Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) detained Lukwago in prison for 
twenty-one months while his asylum claim wound its way through 
the system.13 In August 2001, an immigration judge rejected 
                                                          
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 164. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 165. Under U.S. asylum law, persecution must be 
on account of one of five specified grounds: political opinion, religion, race, 
nationality, or membership in a particular social group. Immigration and 
Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2003). See infra 
Part I (discussing the grounds for obtaining asylum in the United States). 
Lukwago argued that he qualified as a refugee because he was persecuted on 
account of his membership in the particular social group of children from 
Northern Uganda who were abducted and enslaved by the LRA and oppose their 
involuntary servitude. Lukwago, 329 F.3d. at 167. 
13 The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was reorganized in 
2003 following the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) assumed the INS’s 
immigration service functions while its immigration enforcement functions were 
assumed by the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). See 
DHS website, at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/theme_home4.jsp (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2004). The Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), which 
remains under the authority of the Department of Justice, is responsible for 
immigration court proceedings before immigration judges as well as the Board 
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Lukwago’s claim based on his finding that Lukwago’s testimony 
was not credible.14 Specifically, the immigration judge found 
Lukwago not credible due to his demeanor in the courtroom, citing 
his lack of eye contact.15 The IJ also found suspicious Lukwago’s 
                                                          
of Immigration Appeals (BIA). See EOIR website, at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
eoir/background.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2003). This note will continue to refer 
to the USCIS as the INS. The INS transferred Lukwago from prison to prison a 
half a dozen times, usually without warning or explanation. Melissa Dribben, 
Freeing a Former Child Soldier, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 4, 2002, (Magazine), 
available at http://www.law.vill.edu/currentstudents/clinicsandexternships/docs/ 
childsoldier.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2004). In March 2002, following the 
immigration judge’s denial of asylum, INS officers took Lukwago from his cell 
in the York County Prison, drove him to New York’s John F. Kennedy airport, 
and put him on a flight to Madrid. Id. The authorities in Madrid, however, 
refused to accept Lukwago and put him on a return flight to New York. Id. He 
was then returned to the same jail cell in Pennsylvania, all within twenty-four 
hours. Id. 
14 Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 165. Because an applicant’s credible testimony is 
sufficient to satisfy her burden of proof without other corroborating evidence, 
the applicant’s credibility is a crucial factor in the immigration judge’s 
determination of whether the applicant has successfully made a claim for 
asylum. Joanna Ruppel, The Need for a Benefit of the Doubt Standard in 
Credibility Evaluation of Asylum Applicants, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 
2-3 (1991) (explaining that the chaotic conditions that give rise to an applicant’s 
flight from her country of origin often make it impossible for her to obtain 
corroborating evidence, and thus immigration judges frequently must evaluate 
asylum claims based solely on the applicant’s written and oral testimony). See 
infra Part I.A. (discussing an applicant’s burden of proof under U.S. asylum 
law). The immigration judge deciding Lukwago’s case acknowledged that while 
“close observation of a witness testifying under oath is a useful tool in assessing 
credibility . . . [it is] fraught with peril since the interpreter may misinterpret a 
witness’ mannerisms . . . which may or may not have any bearing on 
truthfulness.” Melissa Dribben, Freeing a Former Child Soldier, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Aug. 4, 2002 (Magazine), available at http://www.law.vill.edu/ 
currentstudents/clinicsandexternships/docs/childsoldier.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 
2004). 
15 Melissa Dribben, Freeing a Former Child Soldier, PHILA. INQUIRER, 
Aug. 4, 2002 (Magazine) (citing the immigration judge’s decision, which 
emphasized the fact that “during [Lukwago’s] entire testimony . . . there was 
very little eye contact with the person asking the questions”), available at 
http://www.law.vill.edu/currentstudents/clinicsandexternships/docs/childsoldier.
pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2004). According to Dr. Susan Dicklich, an expert 
witness who appeared at Lukwago’s asylum hearing, however, “[i]n Ugandan 
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response when asked how he felt upon witnessing his parents’ 
murders; he said he had felt “nervous.”16 
Lukwago’s lawyers appealed his case to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA), which rejected the immigration 
judge’s reasons for questioning Lukwago’s credibility.17 
Nonetheless, the BIA denied Lukwago’s request for asylum.18 
Although the BIA acknowledged that the evidence established that 
the LRA “does harm children,” it did not “demonstrate that 
[Lukwago] was targeted by the LRA because he was a child.”19 
Thus, the BIA found that Lukwago had not shown that his 
mistreatment was on account of his membership in a particular 
social group, namely, children in Uganda.20 Indeed, the BIA 
                                                          
culture, it is incredibly rude to look a person of authority directly in the eye.” Id. 
Lukwago’s reluctance to look the judge in the eye indicated his respect for the 
court. Id. 
16 Tina Moore, Former Child Soldier Seeks Asylum from a More Defensive 
INS, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Sept. 13, 2002, available at 
http://www.westlaw.com. 
17 Lukwago, 329 F.3d. at 165. The BIA is the highest administrative body 
for interpreting and applying U.S. immigration laws, with nationwide 
jurisdiction to hear appeals from decisions rendered by immigration judges. 
EOIR website, at http://usdoj.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2004). 
BIA decisions are binding on all immigration judges and Department of 
Homeland Security officers, unless modified or overruled by the Attorney 
General or a federal court. Id. 
18 Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 166. 
19 Id. 
20 Lukwago, 329 F.3d. at 166-68 (noting that Lukwago’s graphic testimony 
clearly established that the LRA’s treatment of him amounted to persecution). 
See infra Part I.A (discussing the definition of “persecution” under U.S. asylum 
case law). The INS argued that Lukwago’s forced military conscription did not 
constitute persecution. Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 168-69 (citing M.A. v. U.S. I.N.S., 
899 F.2d 304, 312 (4th Cir. 1990)) (holding that “a sovereign nation enjoys the 
right to enforce its laws of conscription, and that penalties for evasion are not 
considered persecution”). The Third Circuit distinguished government 
conscription from conscription by guerilla forces, finding that Lukwago did not 
violate a legitimate conscription requirement under Ugandan law, but was 
forcibly abducted by a guerilla organization that was mounting attacks against 
the established government. Id. at 169. Thus, the Third Circuit found that 
Lukwago’s forced conscription, coupled with the physical and psychological 
abuse he endured, constituted persecution. Id. at 170. The Third Circuit, 
BIENMACRO.DOC 4/23/2004  1:15 PM 
 CHILD ASYLUM SEEKERS 801 
questioned whether a group based on age could qualify as a 
particular social group.21 As this case makes clear, U.S. asylum 
law reserves no special protection for children in Lukwago’s 
position. The law treats his misfortune the same as that of any 
adult civilian caught up in the throws of war. 
With hundreds, if not thousands, of children seeking asylum in 
the United States each year, this and many other cases involving 
children raise hard questions about whether the United States 
asylum system adequately recognizes and accounts for the special 
difficulties of child asylum-seekers.22 These questions include 
                                                          
however, agreed with the BIA that Lukwago had been unable to demonstrate 
that his past persecution was on account of his status as a child. Id. at 173. The 
Third Circuit remanded the case to the BIA to reconsider Lukwago’s claim that 
he feared future persecution by the LRA due to his membership in the particular 
social group consisting of escaped LRA child soldiers. Id. at 183. On August 25, 
2003, the BIA granted Lukwago asylum based on the fact that while fighting his 
deportation, he spoke out publicly about his experience as a captured child 
soldier. David Caruso, Ex-Child Soldier, 21, Is Granted Asylum, Sept. 3, 2003, 
PHILA. INQUIRER, at B2. This publicity increased the likelihood that Lukwago 
would be a target of retaliation if he were forced to return to Uganda. Id. 
Although Lukwago was ultimately granted asylum, his case demonstrates the 
enormous hardships that children in the U.S. asylum system confront, including 
prolonged detention and limited access to legal counsel, which are compounded 
by the absence of psychological and social welfare services geared to children. 
See infra Part II.A & B (describing the treatment of child asylum-seekers in the 
United States and the need to increase procedural protections for children in the 
system). 
21 Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 171. 
22 Jacqueline Bhabha & Wendy Young, Not Adults in Miniature: 
Unaccompanied Child Asylum Seekers and the New U.S. Guidelines, 11 INT’L J. 
REFUGEE L. 84, 85 (1999). Throughout this note, the term “child” refers to an 
individual who is under the age of eighteen. The age of eighteen often serves as 
the dividing line separating childhood and adulthood for two primary reasons. 
First, the age of eighteen is widely recognized internationally as the age of legal 
majority. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Refugee Children: 
Guidelines on Protection and Care, 1994, at 8. Second, most individuals under 
the age of eighteen have not “fully developed the emotional maturity and 
judgment, nor achieved the social status, of adults that come with life 
experience.” Id. Thus, in refugee situations, individuals under the age of 
eighteen require “special care and assistance” because they are still “developing 
their identities and learning essential skills” in the absence of the sense of 
security that normally characterizes childhood. Id. The United States currently 
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whether there are additional factors asylum adjudicators should 
consider when deciding whether to grant asylum to children; 
whether the asylum system should afford children special 
procedural protections; whether a different legal standard should 
apply to children’s asylum claims or whether one standard should 
apply equally to adult and child claimants; and whether the United 
States owes a responsibility to children beyond that which it may 
owe adults. 
This note attempts to highlight some of the deficiencies of 
current asylum practice as it pertains to children, describe how 
U.S. asylum policy may be moving towards greater recognition of 
the enormous procedural hardships faced by children in the U.S. 
asylum system, and propose some concrete solutions. Part I 
describes the historical foundations of U.S. asylum law, the 
substance of the law itself, and its application in practice. Part II 
highlights the international measures that have been taken to 
recognize the special status of child refugees. Part III examines the 
ways in which U.S. asylum policy currently responds to child 
refugees, including recent legislative proposals to afford children 
in the asylum system greater procedural protections, and suggests 
ways in which certain procedural protections should be expanded. 
Finally, Part IV discusses the failure of current U.S. asylum law to 
account properly for the forms of persecution unique to children 
and suggests ways to increase substantive protections for children. 
I. THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF U.S. ASYLUM POLICY 
The enormous need for humanitarian action to assist the 
millions of people displaced by the Second World War spurred the 
international community to craft new standards for the protection 
of refugees.23 These humanitarian principles, embodied in the 1951 
                                                          
does not track the number of children who apply for asylum in this country. 
Proposed legislation would, however, require the President to provide statistics 
on unaccompanied refugee children in an annual report to Congress. 
Unaccompanied Child Protection Act of 2003, S.1129, 108th Cong. § 402(a) 
(2003). See infra Part III.A (discussing the important procedural protections 
afforded by the proposed bill). 
23 Michael J. Creppy, Nazi War Criminals in Immigration Law, 12 GEO. 
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United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(1951 Convention) and in its 1967 Protocol (1967 Protocol), 
impose on countries the obligation to protect any individual, 
outside her country of origin, found to have a “well-founded fear 
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”24 
With the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 (Refugee Act), 
the United States, for the first time, provided a comprehensive and 
continuing statutory framework for the admission of refugees into 
this country, and brought the United States into conformity with its 
obligations under the Refugee Convention.25 The Refugee Act 
                                                          
IMMIGR. L.J. 443, 444 (1998) (describing how the first international refugee 
initiatives sought to address the plight of the nearly eight million people 
displaced as a direct result of World War II, of which one million either could 
not return or were unwilling to return to their homes). The United States lacked 
any statutory mechanism to admit individuals fleeing persecution during World 
War II and, thus, tragically failed to protect Jewish refugees attempting to 
escape Nazi persecution. KAREN MUSALO, REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 64 
(1997). In 1939, the United States refused to grant nine hundred German Jews 
safe haven, forcing their ship, the St. Louis, to return to Europe. Id. As a result, 
most of the nine hundred Jewish refugees were subsequently killed by the Nazis. 
Id. 
24 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 
1(A)(2), 189 U.N.T.S 137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]; Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art. 1(2), 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 
267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. In 1968, the United States acceded to the 1967 
Protocol, thereby accepting the 1951 Convention. 1967 Protocol, supra, at 6257. 
The 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol obligate state parties to cooperate with 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), whose primary 
responsibility is to supervise states’ compliance with the provisions of the 
Convention. 1951 Convention, preamble, art. 35 (1); 1967 Protocol, art. II (1). 
25 The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). See S. 
Rep. No. 96-256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979); H.R. Rep. No. 96-608, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979) (noting that the Refugee Act would “bring the United 
States into conformity with our international obligations under the [1951 
Convention and 1967 Protocol]”). Prior to enactment of the Refugee Act, U.S. 
refugee law provided the Attorney General with discretion to withhold the 
deportation of any individual within the United States who would be subjected 
to persecution on account of political opinion, race, or religion. MUSALO, supra 
note 23, at 67. Outside the territory of the United States, only those individuals 
fleeing from communism or countries in the Middle East were eligible for 
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incorporated the definition of “refugee,” as codified by the 
Refugee Convention, into the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA), the basic body of U.S. immigration law.26 Like the Refugee 
Convention, humanitarian principles are central to U.S. refugee 
policy under the Refugee Act.27 The Refugee Act authorizes the 
United States Attorney General to admit refugees from places 
outside as well as inside the United States who meet the statutory 
definition of a refugee.28 
A. Proving Asylum Eligibility under U.S. Law 
In order to make a claim for asylum under the INA, an 
applicant has the burden of establishing that she meets the 
definition of a refugee.29 The INA defines a refugee as a person 
outside her country of nationality, who is “unable or unwilling to 
[return to] that country because of persecution or a well-founded 
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”30 In 
                                                          
refugee status in the United States. Id. 
26 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(42)(A) (2003); 1951 Convention, supra note 24. 
27 U.S. Comm’n on Immigration Reform 1997 Report to Congress: 
Becoming an American: Immigration and Immigrant Policy 69-70, available at 
http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/reports.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2004). The U.S. 
Commission on Immigration Reform, a bi-partisan research commission 
mandated by the Immigration Act of 1990 to examine and make 
recommendations regarding the implementation and impact of U.S. immigration 
policy, stated that asylum and “[r]efugee admissions are based on human rights 
and humanitarian considerations, as one of the several elements of U.S. 
leadership in assisting the world’s persecuted.” Id. 
28 Immigration and Nationality Act § 207(c)(1) (2004). The Attorney 
General is responsible for promulgating regulations for asylum adjudication, 
which are published in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) under Title 8. 
Immigration and Nationality Act § 103(g)(2) (2004). 
29 Immigration and Nationality Act § 208. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 
480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987) (stating that the burden on the applicant is lower than 
the preponderance of the evidence standand and that, therefore, the applicant 
need not show that the situation in her country of origin would probably result in 
persecution, so long as she shows that persecution is a reasonable possibility). 
30 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A) (2004). 
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order to establish a well-founded fear, an applicant must provide 
subjective evidence that she actually fears return, as well as 
objective evidence that there is a reasonable basis for her fear.31 An 
applicant may satisfy her burden of demonstrating her subjective 
fear by expressing her opinions, feelings, and experiences.32 An 
applicant may satisfy the objective requirement through 
documentary evidence, if such evidence is available, or through 
her own persuasive and credible testimony.33 
While the INA does not define persecution, U.S. courts have 
interpreted the term to involve “the infliction of suffering or harm 
upon those who differ . . . in a way that is regarded as offensive.”34 
Although persecution “does not require bodily harm or a threat to 
life or liberty,” it is a strong concept involving more than 
discrimination or harassment.35 The persecutor need not be the 
                                                          
31 In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 445 (B.I.A. 1987) (finding that an 
applicant has established the objective component of a well-founded fear if she 
shows that a reasonable person in her circumstances would fear persecution); In 
re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 221 (B.I.A. 1986) (defining the subjective 
component of a well-founded fear as a genuine apprehension or awareness of 
danger). 
32 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1987) (noting that the 
reference to “fear” in the Immigration and Nationality Act’s definition of a 
refugee requires an examination of the applicant’s subjective mental state); 
Duarte de Guinac v. INS, 179 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that 
an applicant’s credible testimony that she genuinely fears persecution will 
satisfy her burden of proving a subjective fear). 
33 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2004) (stating that an applicant’s credible 
testimony may be sufficient to meet the burden of proof without other 
corroborating evidence); Duarte de Guinac v. INS, 179 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (noting that the applicant can satisfy the objective requirement 
through either “the production of specific documentary evidence or by credible 
and persuasive testimony”). 
34 Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that the Iranian 
government’s enforcement of its strict dress and conduct rules did not rise to the 
level of persecution). See also Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (defining persecution as “oppression which is inflicted on groups or 
individuals because of a difference that the persecutor will not tolerate”). 
35 Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding evidence that 
the applicant’s neighbors threw rocks at her house and stole and damaged her 
property due to her Indo-Fijian ethnicity insufficient to constitute persecution); 
Fisher, 79 F.3d at 961. 
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government as long as the government is unable or unwilling to 
control the persecuting individual or organization.36 
A well-founded fear of persecution may be demonstrated by 
establishing either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future 
persecution.37 Demonstration of past persecution creates a 
rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future 
persecution.38 Where the INS has successfully rebutted an 
applicant’s past persecution claim, the applicant bears the burden 
of raising alternative facts to demonstrate a well-founded fear of 
future persecution.39 
B. Recent Developments in U.S. Asylum Law 
In 1990, the INS created a new corps of asylum adjudicators 
specially trained in evaluating human rights conditions in foreign 
                                                          
36 Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the 
actions of a terrorist group that the government is unable to control are not 
private acts outside the scope of the refugee definition); In re Kasinga, 1996 
B.I.A. LEXIS 15, 25 (1996) (finding that the government’s toleration of the 
practice of female genital mutilation indicates that it is unwilling to control the 
applicant’s persecutors). 
37 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (2004). 
38 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). The INS may rebut the presumption by 
establishing a fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant no 
longer has a well-founded fear of persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A). 
Any change in circumstance, not exclusively those related to country conditions, 
may be considered to contradict the applicant’s asylum claim, “so long as those 
changes are fundamental in nature and go to the basis of the fear of 
persecution.” Federal Register, 65 Fed. Reg. 76121, 76127 (Dec. 6, 2000) (to be 
codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208). In addition, an applicant who has established prima 
facie persecution may nonetheless be denied asylum if the INS can prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the applicant could have reasonably been 
expected to avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of his or her 
country of nationality. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(B). 
39 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2004). Upon a showing of past persecution, 
where the record demonstrates changed country conditions sufficient to 
overcome the well-founded fear presumption, the applicant bears the burden of 
demonstrating that she has a well-founded fear of persecution from any new 
sources. In re N-M-A, 22 I. & N. Dec. 312, 15 (B.I.A. 1998). 
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countries.40 These asylum officers review the asylum applications 
of claimants who apply “affirmatively.”41 Asylum officers may 
either grant an applicant asylum, or alternatively, refer the 
application to the Executive Office of Immigration Review 
(EOIR), commonly known as “immigration court,” for review by 
an immigration judge.42 Applicants who apply affirmatively are 
not placed in detention during proceedings.43 
An applicant must make a defensive asylum claim when the 
INS initiates removal proceedings against her.44 Defensive claims 
are not heard by the asylum corps, but are under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the EOIR.45 Applicants who make defensive claims 
may be detained pending the immigration judge’s determination of 
their eligibility for asylum.46 
                                                          
40 8 C.F.R. § 208.1 (b) (2004). See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS), History of the United States Asylum Corps, at 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/asylum/history.htm#E (last visited Dec. 2, 
2003). The asylum corps works under the USCIS within the Department of 
Homeland Security. Id. 
41 8 C.F.R. § 208.2 (a) (2004). Claimants, who apply affirmatively, 
voluntarily present themselves to the INS. Id. See also USCIS, Obtaining 
Asylum in the United States: Two Paths to Asylum, at 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/asylum/paths.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2003). 
42 USCIS, Obtaining Asylum in the United States: Two Paths to Asylum, at 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/asylum/paths.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2003). 
43 Id. These applicants often turn to family or friends, churches, mosques, 
and other charitable or community-based organizations for support and 
accommodation while they await the adjudication of their asylum claims. See 
CHRISTOPHER J. EINOLF, THE MERCY FACTORY 213-14 (2001). 
44 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b) (2004). See EOIR website, at http://www. 
usdoj.gov/eoir/orginfo.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2004). 
45 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b) (2004). See EOIR website, at http://www. 
usdoj.gov/eoir/orginfo.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2004). 
46 8 C.F.R. § 236(a) (2004). The applicant may be released on a bond of at 
least $1500 on certain conditions determined by the INS District Director. 8 
C.F.R. § 236(a)(2)(A) and (a)(2)(B). There is no judicial review available to 
applicants who have been denied release. 8 C.F.R. § 236(e). There is disturbing 
evidence that the INS continues to detain many individuals who have been 
granted asylum while it pursues appeals of their decisions. HUMAN RIGHTS 
FIRST, IN LIBERTY’S SHADOW: U.S. DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN THE 
ERA OF HOMELAND SECURITY 31 (2004). 
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In addition, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility 
Act of 1996 mandated that the INS detain, and place in expedited 
removal proceedings, asylum applicants identified at U.S. ports of 
entry.47 Those who indicate a fear of persecution during the 
expedited removal process receive a “credible fear” interview with 
an asylum officer.48 At the interview, the applicant must establish 
that that there is a “significant possibility” that she could establish 
eligibility for asylum.49 If the asylum officer determines that the 
applicant has a credible fear of returning to her country of 
nationality, she refers the claim for ordinary removal proceedings 
before an immigration judge, at which time the applicant may raise 
her asylum claim.50 
II. INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF THE SPECIAL LEGAL STATUS 
OF REFUGEE CHILDREN 
Almost half of the twenty-one million refugees in the world are 
children under the age of eighteen.51 As many as 20,000 children, 
                                                          
47 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No.104-208, § 302, 110 Stat. 3009, 3581 [hereinafter IIRAIRA]. See 
USCIS, Obtaining Asylum in the United States: Two Paths to Asylum, at 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/asylum/paths.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2003). 
48 IIRAIRA, supra note 47, § 302; 8 C.F.R. § 208.30 (2004). 
49 IIRAIRA, supra note 47, § 302. 
50 Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f) (2004). If the asylum officer determines that the 
applicant has not established a credible fear of persecution, the asylum officer 
must inform the applicant in writing and inquire whether the applicant wishes to 
appeal the decision to an immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(g)(1), (g)(2)(i) 
(2004). If the immigration judge concurs with the asylum officer’s negative 
decision, the case is referred to the INS for deportation. 8 C.F.R. § 
208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A) (2004). The applicant cannot appeal the immigration 
judge’s decision. Id. 
51 Press release, UNHCR, Half of the Refugees in the World Are Children 
Under 18 Years (May 11, 2002), at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/print?tbl=NEWS&id=3cdf7d6428 (last visited Apr. 13, 2004). The 
United Nations General Assembly established the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1950 to lead and coordinate 
international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems around the 
world. UNHCR website, at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/basics (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2004). 
BIENMACRO.DOC 4/23/2004  1:15 PM 
 CHILD ASYLUM SEEKERS 809 
unaccompanied by parents or legal guardians, apply for asylum 
each year in North America, Europe, and Australia.52 Children flee 
from some of the most atrocious abuses, including forced military 
conscription, female genital mutilation, forced marriage, child 
labor, sexual servitude, and domestic violence.53 According to the 
U.N.’s 1996 Machel Report, a study documenting the effects of 
armed conflict on children, children are not merely innocent 
bystanders to war, but have become targets of genocide, forced 
military recruitment, sexual violence, torture, and exploitation.54 
The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
                                                          
52 UNHCR, The World of Children at a Glance, at http://www.unhcr.ch/ 
children/glance.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2003). UNHCR defines an 
unaccompanied child as a “person who is under the age of eighteen years . . . 
and who is separated from both parents and is not being cared for by an adult 
who by law or custom has responsibility to do so.” UNHCR, Guidelines on 
Policies and Procedures in Dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking 
Asylum, Feb. 1997 [hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines]. In many cases, children 
arrive unaccompanied because their parents have been killed, imprisoned, or 
have taken ill in their country of origin. WENDY AYOTTE & LOUISE 
WILLIAMSON, SEPARATED CHILDREN IN THE U.K.: AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
CURRENT SITUATION 16 (2001), available at http://www.asylum 
support.info/publications/refugeecouncil/seperated.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 
2004) (discussing why children arrive without parents or guardians). In other 
cases, it is the child herself who is at risk and it is her parents’ decision to send 
her to another country for safety. Id. Most parents in developing countries do not 
have the resources to pay for their own travel costs in addition to their child’s. 
Id. 
53 Jacqueline Bhabha & Wendy Young, Not Adults in Miniature: 
Unaccompanied Child Asylum Seekers and the New U.S. Guidelines,11 INT’L J. 
REFUGEE L. 84, 86 (1999). 
54 Report of the Expert of the Secretary-General on the Impact of Armed 
Conflict on Children, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 108, U.N. Doc. 
A/51/306 (1996) [hereinafter Machel Report]. The U.N. Committee on the 
Rights of the Child recommended that the Secretary General appoint Graca 
Machel, the former Minister of Education of Mozambique, as an independent 
expert to study the impact of armed conflict on children. Alison Dundes Renteln, 
The Child Soldier: The Challenge of Enforcing International Standards, 21 
WHITTIER L. REV. 191, 201 (1999). She presented her comprehensive study to 
the U.N. General Assembly in August 1996. Id. Consequently, the General 
Assembly recommended the appointment of a permanent Special Representative 
on the impact of armed conflict on children. Id. 
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represented the first international treaty to explicitly provide 
special protections for children’s rights.55 While international 
refugee law previously viewed a child’s asylum claim as derivative 
of his or her parent’s claim, the CRC obligates states to ensure that 
each child seeking refugee status, whether accompanied or 
unaccompanied by his or her parents, receives protection and 
humanitarian assistance.56 Moreover, the “best interests of the 
child” must be a primary consideration of states in all actions 
concerning children, including those undertaken by public or 
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative 
authorities, and legislative bodies.57 The CRC applies to every 
                                                          
55 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448 
[hereinafter CRC]. 
56 Id., art. 22(1). See also Bhabha & Young, supra note 53, at 87 (noting 
that accompanied children have tended to be subsumed within their family’s 
asylum application, and, thus, immigration and child welfare authorities have 
devoted little attention to refugee children as a distinct group). This note will 
refer to countries or nations as states. 
 57  CRC, supra note 55, at art. 3(1). The drafting history of the CRC 
includes no specific definition of the “best interests of the child” standard. THE 
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: RECONCILING CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 11 
(PHILIP ALSTON, ED. 1994). However, the extensive usage of the standard in the 
domestic law of many states may have led the drafters to reasonably believe that 
states were already sufficiently familiar with the phrase and its application. Id. at 
11. The particular language adopted sheds some light on the intention of the 
drafters with respect to the application of the best interest standard. Id. at 13. For 
instance, the requirement that the child’s best interests be “a primary 
consideration” appears to “impose a burden of proof on those seeking to apply a 
non-child-centered” approach to demonstrate that the other interests at stake are 
equally, if not more, compelling. Id. The term “consideration” suggests a 
process that is genuinely deliberative, as opposed to merely formal. Id. Finally, 
although the CRC does not provide any definitive statement of how an 
individual child’s best interests would be served in a given situation, the rights 
enumerated in the treaty serve as “signposts” to guide adjudicators and 
policymakers seeking to identify a child’s best interests. Id. at 19. The American 
Bar Association’s Standards of Practice for Lawyer’s Representing a Child in 
Abuse and Neglect Cases state that where a lawyer is appointed to represent the 
“best interests” of the child, that determination “should be based on objective 
criteria addressing the child’s specific needs and preferences, the goal of 
expeditious resolution of the case . . . and the use of the least 
restrictive/detrimental alternatives available.” American Bar Association, 
BIENMACRO.DOC 4/23/2004  1:15 PM 
 CHILD ASYLUM SEEKERS 811 
child within a state’s jurisdiction and prohibits discrimination 
irrespective of the child’s or her parent’s birth or any other status.58 
Over 190 countries have ratified the CRC, making it the most 
ratified human rights treaty in history.59 Although the U.S. has not 
ratified the treaty, it is a signatory, and thus is obliged under 
international treaty law to refrain from acts which would defeat the 
object and purpose of the Convention.60 The INS has 
                                                          
Standards of Practice for Lawyers Representing a Child in Abuse and Neglect 
Cases (1996), available at http://www.abanet.org/child/ childrep.html (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2004). 
58 CRC, supra note 55, at art. 2(1). 
 59  See UNHCR at http://www.unhcr.ch (last visited Feb. 4, 2004) 
(providing the complete list of States Parties to the Convention on the Rights of 
Children). 
60 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 18(a), 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331. The act of signing a treaty generally expresses a state’s 
consent to be bound to the treaty, even though the further step of ratification is 
required for the treaty to enter into force with respect to that state. ANTHONY 
AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 75 (2000). Thus, in the period prior 
to ratification, the signatory state is under an obligation to refrain from doing 
anything that would “affect its ability fully to comply with the treaty once it has 
entered into force” or “invalidate the basic purpose of the treaty.” Id. at 94. See 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DETAINED AND DEPRIVED OF RIGHTS: CHILDREN IN 
INS CUSTODY, n.40, available at http://www.hrw.org/ reports98/ins2/berks98d-
01.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2003) (documenting the INS’s practice of detaining 
refugee children in centers for juvenile offenders, where they are subjected to 
strip-searches and other degrading treatment, in violation of the rights protected 
under the CRC). Other than the United States, Somalia is the only other U.N.-
member state not to have ratified the CRC. Id. Prior to ratifying any treaty, the 
United States undertakes an extensive evaluation of its domestic laws and 
practices at both the federal and state level to determine how to bring them into 
compliance with the treaty. See United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 
Convention on the Rights of the Child: Frequently Asked Questions, at 
http://www.unicef.org/crc/crc.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2004). This evaluation 
can take several years, particularly in cases in which certain provisions of the 
treaty are viewed as controversial. Id. According to the United States Fund for 
UNICEF, one of 37 national committees set up to support the work of UNICEF, 
two factors have held up U.S. ratification of the CRC: “widespread 
misconceptions about the [CRC’s] intent, provisions, and potential impact; and 
political opposition.” United States Fund for UNICEF, Frequently Asked 
Questions, at http://capwiz.com/ unicefusa/issues/alert/?alertid=32697 (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2004). Opponents of the CRC argue that it intrudes upon the 
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acknowledged that the CRC serves as a significant source of 
guidance in developing U.S. policies for child asylum seekers.61 
In 1997, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees proposed a 
set of children’s asylum guidelines based on the CRC’s 
international norms for the protection of children’s rights.62 The 
UNHCR Guidelines, like the CRC, underscore the importance of 
delivering effective protection and assistance to children in a 
systematic, comprehensive, and integrated way.63 Although such a 
comprehensive approach would require close collaboration among 
a wide variety of government bodies, specialized agencies, and 
non-governmental groups, such collaboration would be possible 
because the “best interests” principle would provide clear guidance 
                                                          
parent-child relationship by, for example, recognizing a child’s right to sue her 
parents and obtain an abortion. Id. In response, CRC supporters point to 
language in the CRC that repeatedly emphasizes the primacy and importance of 
the family in decisions concerning children. Id. In particular, article 5 obligates 
parties to the CRC “to respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of 
parents . . . to provide . . . appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by 
the child of the rights recognized in the present Convention.” CRC, supra note 
55, at art.5. Supporters also point out that the CRC does not explicitly require 
states to afford children the right to sue their parents, although there must be 
some mechanism in place to allow children to vindicate their rights, or obtain an 
abortion. United States Fund for UNICEF, Frequently Asked Questions, at 
http://capwiz.com/unicefusa/ issues/alert/?alertid=32697 (last visited Apr. 8, 
2004). Due to these controversies, evaluation of the CRC has not been a priority 
of the U.S. Senate. Id. 
61 See infra Part III.A (discussing how the CRC, UNHCR guidelines, and 
other international human rights instruments provide important guidance to U.S. 
asylum policymakers). 
62 UNHCR guidelines, supra note 52. In enacting the Refugee Act, 
Congress rewrote U.S. immigration law to bring the United States in line with 
its international obligations under the Refugee Convention. MUSALO, supra note 
24, at 57. Thus, because U.S. law is based on international law, UNHCR 
interpretations of international refugee law, while not binding on the U.S., are 
important tools for guiding U.S. refugee law. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 
U.S. 421, 438-49 (1987) (citing the U.N. Handbook on Procedures and Criteria 
for Determining Refugee Status as a source in interpreting U.S. asylum and 
refugee law). 
63 UNHCR guidelines, supra note 52, § 1.4 (interpreting Article 22(1) of 
the CRC as requiring states to take a comprehensive and systematic approach to 
the protection of unaccompanied children). 
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to policymakers in all actions pertaining to children.64 For 
example, the UNHCR Guidelines suggest that states appoint each 
child a legal representative, as well as a guardian or advisor with 
child welfare expertise, to ensure that the child’s interests are 
safeguarded and her needs appropriately met.65 The UNHCR 
Guidelines further urge states to not detain child applicants in 
prison-like conditions, establish an expedited procedure to process 
their claims, and take into account each child’s stage of 
development and particular vulnerabilities when assessing her 
claim.66 Perhaps most significantly, the UNHCR Guidelines call 
attention to the types of human rights abuses that may constitute 
persecution under the Refugee Convention for children, but not for 
adults.67 
Before the UNHCR issued its guidelines, Canada and the 
United Kingdom, which also account for a high percentage of all 
asylum claims lodged in industrialized countries, had taken steps to 
ensure that their domestic asylum laws reflected their international 
commitments to meet the needs of child asylum seekers.68 In 1996, 
                                                          
64 Id., § 1.5 (stating that policymakers should rely on the “best interests” 
principle to guide them in developing asylum policies for children). 
65 Id. §§ 4.2 & 5.7 (recommending that states provide children with a legal 
representative and establish an independent and formally accredited organization 
that will appoint each child a guardian or advisor). 
66 Id. § 7.6 (urging states not to detain children); § 7.7 (stating that 
detention should only be used as a measure of last resort and for the shortest 
appropriate period of time); §§ 8.1 & 8.5 (urging states to develop expedient 
proceedings for children that take into account their special needs and 
vulnerabilities); § 8.4 (suggesting that asylum adjudicators undergo training to 
familiarize them with the special situation of unaccompanied children); § 8.6 
(suggesting that asylum adjudicators pay particular regard to a child’s stage of 
development and limited knowledge of conditions in her country of origin in 
assessing her asylum claim). 
67 Id. § 8.7. The guidelines identify the following practices as constituting 
persecution under the Refugee Convention: military recruitment of children, 
their subjection to forced labor, the trafficking of children for prostitution and 
sexual exploitation, and the practice of female genital mutilation. Id. See infra 
Part IV.B (arguing for the need to reform U.S. asylum law to account for the 
forms of persecution unique to children). 
68 Protecting the Rights of Children: The Need for U.S. Children’s Asylum 
Guidelines, Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, 
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Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board issued a set of 
innovative guidelines concerning child applicants.69 The Canadian 
guidelines provide for the appointment of a “designated 
representative” to ensure the protection of the child’s “best 
interests” throughout the asylum process.70 In addition, they 
attempt to ease the burden on unaccompanied children by 
establishing a special procedure for their claims and an evidentiary 
standard sensitive to each child’s level of maturity and 
development.71 
                                                          
December 1998, at 5-8. [hereinafter Women’s Commission Report]. See 
UNHCR, Asylum Applications Lodged in Industrialized Countries: Levels and 
Trends, 2000-2002, available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/statistics 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2004) (stating that, in absolute terms, the United Kingdom 
was the largest asylum-seeker receiving country in the industrialized world in 
2002, accounting for 19 percent of all asylum applications lodged, followed by 
the United States with 14 percent of all claims, and by Canada with 5.7 percent 
of all claims). 
69 Child Refugee Claimants: Procedural and Evidentiary Issues, available 
at http://www.cisr.gc.ca/en/about/ guidelines/child_e.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 
2004) [hereinafter Canadian Guidelines]. Canada’s Immigration and Refugee 
Board is the federal agency tasked with adjudicating asylum claims. The 
Immigration and Refugee Board: What It Is and How It Works, at 
http://www.cisr.gc.ca/en/researchpub/pub/pamphlet/ index_e.htm (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2004). The Canadian Guidelines preceded the UNHCR guidelines and 
are less far-reaching. Bhabha & Young, supra note 53, at 90. 
70 Canadian Guidelines, supra note 69, at A.II (stating that the designated 
representative’s duties include retaining counsel for the child, assisting the child 
to gather evidence for her claim, and acting as a witness for the child). Before 
designating a person to represent the child, the Guidelines require that the 
Convention Refugee Determination Division of the Canadian Refugee Board 
inform the proposed designated representative of her duties and conduct an 
assessment of the person’s ability to fulfill those duties. Id. The Guidelines 
require that the designated representative possess “an appreciation of the nature 
of the proceedings,” and suggest as factors for consideration the representative’s 
“linguistic and cultural background, age, gender, and other personal 
characteristics.” Id. In addition, the designated representative must not pose a 
conflict of interest situation with the child such that the representative would not 
act in the child’s best interests. Id. 
71 Id. at Part B.I-II (noting that children are often unable to present 
evidence with the same degree of precision as adults and that, therefore, more 
weight should be given to the objective elements of the child’s claim). 
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The United Kingdom has also taken steps to address the 
particular difficulties children face in the system.72 In 1994, the 
United Kingdom’s Home Office, the government department 
responsible for internal affairs, developed the Refugee Council 
Panel of Advisors for Unaccompanied Refugee Children 
(Children’s Panel).73 The Children’s Panel was designed to provide 
advice, support, and advocacy to child applicants, independent of 
the U.K. Immigration and Nationality Department, to ensure that 
they receive fair and equal access to legal representation, care, and 
accommodation.74 Although the advisors do not represent the 
children in asylum proceedings, they provide children with 
assistance in finding qualified legal counsel.75 Moreover, the 
advisors are responsible for meeting the child’s educational, 
housing, health care, and other social welfare needs throughout the 
                                                          
72 Simon Russell, Unaccompanied Refugee Children in the United 
Kingdom, 11 INT’L J. REFUGEE L 126, 135 (1999) (arguing that the Children’s 
Panel plays a vital role in the first stages of a child’s asylum determination 
process). 
73 AYOTTE, supra note 52, at 3, 6-7 (2001) (analyzing the United 
Kingdom’s response to unaccompanied children “against a European-wide 
framework of good-practice and recommending areas for improvement). 
74 U.K. Immigration and Nationality Directorate, Unaccompanied Asylum 
Seeking Children Note, § 5.2, available at http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2004). 
75 AYOTTE, supra note 52, at 6-7 (stating that each child is assigned an 
advisor who plays a “comprehensive role in supporting the child in relation to 
any aspect of [her] situation as an [unaccompanied] child, including immigration 
and welfare matters”). Unaccompanied children applying for asylum in the 
United Kingdom are afforded aid to pay for their legal assistance. Id. at 23. 
Ayotte argues that the Children’s Panel will be unable to meet the needs of the 
growing number of unaccompanied children arriving in the United Kingdom 
without an increase in its funding and resources. Id. Moreover, due to 
inadequate resources, advisors are only able to provide support to the child when 
she first arrives in the U.K., and thus do not play a continuing role in ensuring 
the child’s interests are protected and her needs met. Id. See also Refugee 
Council website, at http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/refugeecouncil/what/ 
what002.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2004). The Refugee Council is a charitable 
organization that receives funding from the U.K. government, the European 
Commission, trusts, and its members. Refugee Council website, at 
http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/refugeecouncil/ therefugeecouncil.htm (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2004). 
BIENMACRO.DOC 4/23/2004  1:15 PM 
816 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
asylum process.76 
III. CHILDREN IN THE U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM 
U.S. asylum policy has not traditionally differentiated between 
the claims of children and adults.77 With increasing numbers of 
child asylum seekers entering the U.S. each year, however, the 
U.S. has become far more responsive to international and domestic 
pressure to expand the protections afforded to children.78 
Every year, thousands of children enter the United States 
seeking protection from human rights abuses occurring in their 
countries of origin.79 Many of these children enter unaccompanied 
by parents or guardians.80 In 2002, U.S. authorities apprehended 
more than five thousand unaccompanied children attempting to 
enter the country without documentation.81 Many of these children 
are victims of highly profitable child smuggling and trafficking 
rings.82 
                                                          
76 AYOTTE, supra note 52, at 6-7. 
77 See Bhabha & Young, supra note 53, at 115. 
78 See id. See infra Part III.A (discussing recent positive changes in the 
procedural protections afforded to child asylum seekers). 
79 See Women’s Commission Report, supra note 68, at 2. 
80 Id. The INS defines an unaccompanied minor as a child under the age of 
eighteen who seeks admission to the United States and who is not accompanied 
by a parent or guardian. See Immigration and Naturalization Service, Guidelines 
for Children’s Asylum Claims, at 5, n.10 (December 10, 1998) [hereinafter INS 
Guidelines], available at 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/lawsregs/handbook/10a_ChldrnGdlns.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2004). See also AYOTTE, supra note 52, at 16 (discussing the reasons 
why children arrive unaccompanied). 
81 See Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, U.S. Senate, 
May 22, 2003, 149 CONG. REC. S7020 (Statement of Sen. Feinstein) (“[F]ive-
thousand foreign-born children [who lack] parents or legal guardians to protect 
them are discovered in the United States each year in need of protection.”). 
82 See Ginger Thompson, Littlest Immigrants, Left in Hands of Smugglers, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2003, at A1 (discussing how tightened security following 
the September 11th attacks has made it much harder for illegal immigrants to 
cross the U.S. border, forcing parents illegally living in the United States to 
either allow others to raise their children in their home country or hire smugglers 
to sneak their children into the United States). 
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Prior to 1997, the INS regularly detained children in prisons 
alongside juvenile delinquents and adult offenders.83 As part of the 
settlement agreement reached in Reno v. Flores, a 1993 federal 
class-action suit challenging the INS’s detention of unaccompanied 
minors in prison-like conditions, the INS agreed to place detained 
children “in the least restrictive setting” in light of the child’s age 
and special needs.84 The INS may detain children in juvenile 
correction facilities only if the child presents a risk of flight or has 
a criminal record.85 Although INS detention practices have 
improved in some areas, many argue that the INS has made far too 
little progress in seeking out alternatives to detention, such as 
release to relatives and foster care.86 Even after the Flores 
                                                          
83 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993). See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
SLIPPING THROUGH THE CRACKS: UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN DETAINED BY 
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/uscrcks/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2004) 
(documenting the INS’s practice of locking up unaccompanied children with 
convicted juvenile offenders, and sometimes with adult offenders, forcing them 
to wear prison uniforms, and providing them with minimal access to counseling, 
legal services, and information about their rights). See also CENTER FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, FAILED BY FEDERALISM: AD HOC POLICY-
MAKING TOWARD DETAINED IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE CHILDREN 17 (2001), 
available at http://www.centerforhumanrights.org/Detained_minors/Minors 
PolicyAnalysis.pdf (last visited December 2, 2003) (documenting violations of 
the Flores settlement agreement in INS-contracted detention centers). 
84 Processing, Detention, and Release of Juveniles, 63 Fed. Reg. 39759, 
39760 (proposed July 24, 1998) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 236.3) (setting out 
interim regulations based on the Flores settlement agreement). 
85 Id. at 39,760 (“If a juvenile has committed a crime or a juvenile 
delinquent offense, has committed or threatened to commit violent acts, has 
engaged in disruptive behavior, is an escape risk, or is in danger, the [INS] may 
place him or her in a juvenile detention facility or a[n] [INS] facility having 
separate accommodations for juveniles.”). “[I]solated offense[s] . . . not within a 
pattern of criminal activity and . . . not involv[ing] violence against a person or 
the use or carrying of a weapon” do not constitute offenses permitting detention 
in secure facilities. Id. at 39762. Petty offenses, such a shoplifting, joy riding, 
and disturbing the peace, are not considered offenses justifying secure detention. 
Id. 
86 Women’s Commission Report, supra note 68, at 14 (noting that the INS 
has made some improvements by opening group shelters in some regions). 
AMNESTY INT’L, WHY AM I HERE?: CHILDREN IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION 
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settlement, nearly one-third of unaccompanied children remain 
housed in secure detention facilities designed for juvenile 
offenders.87 In response to concern over the INS’s perceived 
conflict of interest in serving concurrently as jailor, prosecutor, and 
caretaker of unaccompanied children, Congress recently 
transferred responsibility for the care and custody of child asylum 
seekers from the INS to the Office of Refugee Resettlement 
(ORR).88 
                                                          
(2003), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/refugee/children_ 
detention.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2004) (arguing that the INS has overused 
secure detention for unaccompanied children and failed to place many children 
in the “least restricted setting” required by the Flores settlement) [hereinafter 
AMNESTY REPORT]. According to the Center for Human Rights and 
Constitutional Law, a public interest legal foundation that promotes respect for 
the human and constitutional rights of immigrants and refugees, the INS 
detained 4736 unaccompanied children from 1999-2000. CTR. FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, FAILED BY FEDERALISM: AD HOC POLICY-
MAKING TOWARD DETAINED IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE CHILDREN 10 (2001), 
available at http://www.centerforhumanrights.org/Detained_minors/Minors 
PolicyAnalysis.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2004). The average age of all children 
detained was approximately 15.26 years. Id. The average number of days spent 
in detention was 77.21 days. Id. at 11. Thirty-two percent of children spent time 
in secure lock-ups due to insufficient space at non-secure facilities. Id. 
87 AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 86, at 1. Only 17 percent of the secure 
facilities that responded to Amnesty International’s inquiry reported that 
unaccompanied children are separated from juvenile offenders. Id. at 23-24. 
Nearly half reported that they house unaccompanied children in the same cell as 
juvenile offenders. Id. at 23-24. The majority of unaccompanied children 
detained in secure facilities are non-delinquent. Id. at 21. Unaccompanied 
children are often categorized as “escape risks” in order to justify housing them 
in secure facilities without an individual assessment of whether the risk is 
genuine. Id. 
88 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 462 (2002). See 
The Treatment of Children in INS Custody: Hearings Before the Senate 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, available at http://www.womens 
commission.org/take_action/testimony.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2004) (citing 
the fact that the INS frequently denied release from detention to children who 
had been granted asylum because the agency itself had decided to appeal the 
decision); Christopher Nugent and Steven Schulman, A New Era in the Legal 
Treatment of Alien Children: The Homeland Security and Child Status 
Protection Acts, 80 No. 7 INTERPRETER RELEASES 233 (Feb. 19, 2003) 
(emphasizing that the transfer in responsibility from the INS, a law enforcement 
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A. Changes in the Procedural Protections Afforded to Child 
Asylum Seekers 
There are positive indications that U.S. refugee policy is 
moving toward a greater awareness of the particular procedural 
obstacles children face in the asylum system. On December 10, 
1998, the INS issued guidelines providing asylum officers with 
child-sensitive interview procedures and training.89 
The INS Guidelines set forth special procedures to remedy the 
particular difficulties that children face in applying for asylum, and 
accept the CRC’s “best interests of the child” standard as a “useful 
measure” for determining appropriate interview techniques for 
child asylum seekers.90 For example, the Guidelines call for 
training INS personnel in the unique needs of children asylum 
seekers, with the goal of creating a “‘child-friendly’ asylum 
interview environment.”91 To this end, the Guidelines suggest 
several steps to assist in “building rapport” with children 
                                                          
agency, to the ORR, a human services agency, represents a positive step toward 
recognizing unaccompanied children’s welfare and protection needs). See 149 
CONG. REC. S7026 (May 22, 2003) (noting that the ORR, a human services 
agency within the Department of Health and Human Services, has “decades of 
experience working with foreign-born children”). 
89 INS Guidelines, supra note 80. The INS Guidelines were issued on 
December 10th in honor of International Human Rights Day. Several academic 
institutions and non-profit organizations, including the Women’s Commission 
for Refugee Women and Children, a non-profit organization that advocates for 
refugee women and children around the world, collaborated with the INS to 
develop the guidelines, which draw from many of the innovations proposed in 
the 1996 Canadian Guidelines as well as the 1997 UNHCR Guidelines. Further 
information about the Commission is available at http://www.womens 
commission.org. 
90 INS Guidelines, supra note 80, at 2. The United States has signed, but 
not ratified, the CRC. See U.S. Finally Agrees to Sign U.N. Accord for Children, 
CHI. TRIBUNE., Feb. 12, 1995, available at 1995 WL 6165212. Nevertheless, the 
INS Guidelines affirm that the CRC and other international instruments “need 
not be ratified by the U.S. to provide guidance as a source of human rights 
norms.” Id. at 2 n.1. See supra Part.II. In referring to the best interests of the 
child principle as a “useful measure,” the INS is acknowledging the principle’s 
relevance to its policies pertaining to children. 
91 INS Guidelines, supra note 80, at 5. 
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applicants.92 For example, interviews begin with a discussion of 
“neutral topics,” such as career goals, school, pets, and hobbies, an 
explanation of what will happen during the asylum interview, and 
reassurance that the child is not expected to be able to answer all of 
the questions asked of her and that her answers will remain 
confidential.93 In addition, the Guidelines suggest that officers 
“take the initiative” in actively evaluating whether the child 
understands the process by “watch[ing] for non-verbal clues, such 
as a puzzled look, knitted eyebrows, downcast eyes, long pauses, 
and irrelevant responses.”94 
Moreover, the Guidelines acknowledge that children “may be 
less forthcoming than adults . . . in order not to relive their trauma” 
and recognize that children “may not present their cases in the 
same way as adults.”95 Thus, the asylum officer’s questions should 
be “tailored to the child’s age, stage of language development, 
background, and level of sophistication.”96 While the burden of 
proof remains on the child to prove her asylum eligibility, the 
asylum officer must take the child’s “age, relative maturity, ability 
to recall events, and psychological make-up . . . into account when 
assessing the credibility of a claim and must . . . gather as much 
objective evidence as possible to evaluate the claim.”97 
The INS Guidelines also stress the key role that children’s 
guardians can play in protecting the best interests of the child in 
the asylum process.98 Guardians are commonly used in other areas 
of U.S. law to assist children. For example, federal law requires 
states to provide children who are the subject of abuse or neglect 
proceedings with a “guardian ad litem, who may be an attorney or 
                                                          
92 Id. at 7. 
93 Id. at 8. 
94 Id. at 9. 
95 INS Guidelines, supra note 80, at 5. 
96 Id. at 10. 
97 Id. at 17. Objective evidence may include country reports detailing the 
human rights situation or cultural practices in a child’s country of origin, an 
evaluation of a child’s medical or psychological condition, as well as other 
documentary evidence. See INS Guidelines, supra note 80, at 13. 
98 Id. at 5. 
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a court appointed special advocate (or both).”99 These guardians 
are responsible for “obtain[ing] firsthand, a clear understanding of 
the situation and needs of the child and . . . mak[ing] 
recommendations to the court concerning the best interests of the 
child.”100 The INS Guidelines envision that guardians would assist 
in “bridg[ing] the gap between the child’s culture and the U.S. 
asylum interview.”101 The INS Guidelines refer to the guardian as 
a “trusted adult,” noting that “a child’s parent or relative [may be] 
a logical and appropriate support person.”102 
Although the INS Guidelines affirm the significance of 
children’s guardians in the asylum process, they ultimately place 
no affirmative responsibility on the government to provide each 
child with a guardian.103 Furthermore, although parents, friends, 
and other trusted adults often provide invaluable support to child 
applicants, child welfare professionals with expertise in the 
particular needs of children asylum seekers could provide a higher 
level of assistance.104 The need for a corps of child welfare 
professionals is especially relevant for unaccompanied children, 
who often lack access to trusted adults.105 Moreover, the INS 
                                                          
99 See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 
5101 (1974) (requiring states to appoint a Guardian ad Litem in every abuse and 
neglect proceeding in order to receive federal funding and assistance). 
100 Id. at § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(ix). 
101 INS Guidelines, supra note 80, at 6. 
102 Id. 
103 See INS Guidelines, supra note 80, at 5, n.12 (“[T]here is no 
requirement that a child bring an adult to the interview either to serve as a 
support person, attorney, or accredited representative.”). 
104 UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 52, § 5.7 (encouraging the use of 
guardians who have “the necessary expertise in the field of child caring, so as to 
ensure that the interests of the child are safeguarded, and that the child’s legal, 
social, medical, and psychological needs are appropriately covered” during the 
asylum determination process). 
105 UNHCR, Refugee Children: Guidelines on Protection and Care, 1994, at 
43 (noting that unaccompanied children lack trusted adults to assist them by 
providing factual information to document their claims, supporting them 
emotionally, and explaining the asylum determination procedures). See INS 
Guidelines, supra note 80, at 17 (acknowledging that “a child who has filed a 
separate asylum application . . . [is] frequently without the support of familiar 
adults”). 
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Guidelines do not guarantee that child asylum seekers will receive 
legal counsel.106 Presently, less than half of the children in INS 
custody have representation.107 
In May 2003, Senator Diane Feinstein introduced bipartisan 
legislation in the U.S. Senate that would significantly expand 
services for children who arrive unaccompanied in the U.S.108 
Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren introduced an identical bill in the 
U.S. House of Representatives in October 2003.109 The bill, titled 
the “Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2003,” would 
require children under the age of eighteen in federal custody to be 
represented by counsel in immigration proceedings.110 If pro bono 
representation is not available to a child, the bill mandates 
provision of government-funded legal representation.111 The bill 
would also establish a pilot program to develop an independent 
corps of guardians ad litem with expertise in child welfare.112 
These guardians would serve to “ensure that the [child’s] best 
interests . . . are promoted . . . in [immigration] proceedings.”113 
Enactment of the bill would represent a major step towards treating 
child asylum seekers with the care and sensitivity they deserve.114 
                                                          
106 See INS Guidelines, supra note 80. 
107 See 149 CONG. REC. S7026 (May 22, 2003) (noting that “statistics 
demonstrate that applications for asylum are four times more likely to be granted 
when represented by counsel”). 
108 Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2003, S.1129, 108th 
Cong. (2003) (establishing a Guardian ad litem program, ensuring that 
unaccompanied minors have access to legal counsel, and calling upon the 
Department of Justice to adopt the INS Guidelines in its handling of children’s 
asylum claims before immigration judges and the BIA). 
109 Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 3361, 108th 
Cong. (2003). 
110 Id. § 202(a)(1). 
111 Id. § 202(a)(3). 
112 Id. § 201(a)(3)(E). 
113 Id. Supra note 57 (discussing the “best interests of the child” standard). 
114 The Treatment of Children in INS Custody: Hearings Before the Senate 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of 
Wendy Young) (noting that the proposed bill addresses many of the “significant 
procedural gaps in U.S. policy and practice [that] jeopardize the protection of 
[child refugees]”). 
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The bill would redefine the government’s priorities with respect to 
refugee children by making the protection of their interests central 
to all actions and proceedings.115 
B. Remaining Procedural Obstacles 
In 1996, spurred by a wave of anti-immigrant sentiment, 
Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA).116 IIRAIRA placed a one-year 
filing deadline on all applicants, even those residing legally in the 
United States, to submit their asylum applications for 
adjudication.117 The deadline may be overcome by showing that (a) 
circumstances materially affecting the applicant’s eligibility for 
asylum have changed; or, (b) extraordinary circumstances led to 
the delay in filing.118 While the one-year deadline may increase the 
                                                          
115 149 CONG. REC. S7026 (May 22, 2003) (“[I]n all proceedings and 
actions, the government should have as a high priority protecting the interests of 
[unaccompanied] children, most of whom are unable to understand the nature of 
the proceedings in which they are involved.”). 
116 IIRAIRA, supra note 47, § 604. See Conference Report on IIRAIRA 
(Sept. 25, 1996), Rep. Rohrabacher, “We are supposed to be watching out for 
our own people. When we allocate money for benefits, for service, SSI and 
unemployment benefits, it is supposed to benefit our citizens, the people that are 
paying taxes, who fought our wars.” 
117 IIRAIRA, supra note 47, § 604; Immigration and Nationality Act § 208 
(a)(2)(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (a)(2)(B) (2003) (requiring an asylum applicant to 
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that her application has been filed 
within one year of the date of her arrival in the United States). 
118 Immigration and Nationality Act § 208 (a)(2)(D) (2003); 8 C.F.R. § 
208.4(a)(2) (2004). The regulations provide a non-exhaustive list of the types of 
changed circumstances that may qualify as exceptions to the one-year filing rule, 
including (a) changes in conditions in the applicant’s country of nationality, (b) 
changes in applicable U.S. law, (c) changes in the applicant’s personal 
circumstances, such as recent political activism or conversion from one religion 
to another, or (d) the ending of an applicant’s dependent relationship to the 
principal applicant in a previous application. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(i)(A), (B), 
and (C). The regulations also provide a list of circumstances that could be 
considered extraordinary, such as (a) serious illness, (b) legal disability, e.g., the 
applicant is an unaccompanied minor or suffered from mental impairment 
during the first year after arrival, (c) death or serious illness of a family member 
or legal representative, or (d) other circumstances, depending on the facts of the 
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efficiency of the system by weeding out applicants who lack bona 
fide asylum claims, it raises concerns that genuine refugees who 
inadvertently miss the deadline will be barred from gaining 
asylum.119 These concerns are particularly relevant for children 
seeking asylum who may lack the maturity to understand the 
intricacies of U.S. asylum law and frequently do not have access to 
legal counsel.120 
The INS regulations implementing IIRAIRA partly address 
these concerns by providing asylum adjudicators with the 
discretion to exempt unaccompanied children from the one-year 
deadline.121 According to the regulations, in some cases, children 
lacking parental or caregiver accompaniment may suffer from a 
legal disability grave enough to invoke the extraordinary 
circumstances exception.122 For example, the BIA found that a 
fifteen year-old unaccompanied child who was detained in INS 
custody during the one-year period immediately following his 
arrival in the United States established extraordinary circumstances 
that excused his failure to file for asylum before the expiration of 
the one-year deadline.123 
Accompanied children, however, would not be permitted the 
                                                          
case, including severe family or spousal opposition, extreme isolation within a 
refugee community, profound language barriers, or profound difficulties in 
cultural acclimatization. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(i), (ii), and (vi); INS, Asylum 
Officer Basic Training Course: One-Year Filing Deadline (March 15, 2001) at 
16-17 (on file with author). 
119 Women’s Commission Report, supra note 68, at 6. 
120 149 CONG. REC. S7020 (May 22, 2003) (“Children . . . have incredible 
difficulty understanding the complexities of the immigration system . . . . 
[Despite this,] most children in immigration custody are overlooked and 
unrepresented.”). 
121 8 C.F.R. § 208.4 (a)(5)(ii). The proposed Unaccompanied Alien Child 
Protection Act would make this exemption mandatory for all unaccompanied 
minors. Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2003, S.1129, 108th 
Cong. § 403(b) (2003). 
122 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(ii). 
123 In re Y-C-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 286, 288 (BIA 2002) (finding that the 
detention of an unaccompanied child during the one-year period following his 
arrival in the United States constitutes extraordinary circumstances sufficient to 
overcome the one-year filing deadline). 
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same exemption, under the assumption that these children would 
derive their status from a parent’s claim or would be aided by a 
parent in making an asylum claim.124 This rationale, while true in 
many instances, fails to take into account that some children may 
have interests contrary to those of their parents.125 For example, a 
child who has suffered severe abuse at the hands of an 
accompanying parent would have grounds for asylum while the 
accompanying parent would not.126 In a situation where an abusive 
parent might wish to protect himself against potential criminal 
charges, or may simply wish to remain undetected by the INS, the 
accompanying parent may have an interest in preventing the child 
from applying for asylum.127 In such a case, the child’s failure to 
file before the expiration of the one-year deadline would result in 
grave consequences. 
The INS regulations should provide asylum adjudicators with 
discretion to take into account the factors that prevent any child, 
whether accompanied or unaccompanied, from seeking asylum 
within the first year of her arrival before barring her claim for 
exceeding the deadline. In fact, the INS proposed a similar 
approach in its basic training course for asylum officers.128 In 
addition to the list of “extraordinary” circumstances sufficient to 
overcome the one-year filing deadline in the CFR, the training 
course discusses additional circumstances, such as severe family 
opposition, language barriers, or profound difficulties in cultural 
adjustment, which may also constitute extraordinary 
                                                          
124 Bhabha & Young, supra note 53, at 113 (arguing that no individualized 
determination procedure is envisaged with respect to accompanied children due 
to the principle of family unity, i.e., the children derive their refugee status from 
the head of the family). 
125 Bhabha & Young, supra note 53, at 114. 
126 Id. at 107. See Aguirre-Cervantes v. INS, 242 F.3d 1169 (2001) 
(overturning the BIA’s denial of asylum to a young woman from Mexico whose 
father subjected her and her family members to extreme physical abuse on 
account of her membership in the particular social group consisting of her 
immediate family). 
127 Women’s Commission Report, supra note 68, at 7. 
128 INS, Asylum Officer Basic Training Course: One-Year Filing Deadline 
(March 15, 2001), at 16-17. 
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circumstances.129 These additional considerations should be 
included in the CFR in order to afford immigration judges the 
same discretion as asylum officers to protect both accompanied 
and unaccompanied children from the harsh consequences of the 
one-year deadline. 
IV. NEEDED CHANGES IN CHILDREN’S SUBSTANTIVE ELIGIBILITY 
FOR ASYLUM 
In order to fully realize the INS Guidelines’ admirable goal of 
protecting children in the U.S. asylum system, U.S. policymakers 
must consider whether children require a separate substantive legal 
standard that accounts for their status as children. In addition, U.S. 
policymakers must address the fact that U.S. asylum law often fails 
to acknowledge the specific forms of persecution unique to child 
applicants. Finally, the increasing subjection of children to forced 
conscription in armed conflicts around the world demands that 
policymakers evaluate whether the exclusion principle, which bars 
“persecutors of others” from receiving asylum protection, should 
be applied to former child soldiers seeking asylum. 
A. Applying a Separate Legal Standard to Children’s Asylum 
Claims 
Although the INS Guidelines and the proposed bill expand the 
procedural protections for children who apply for asylum, they do 
not significantly alter a child’s substantive eligibility under U.S. 
asylum law.130 Thus, while directing asylum officers to take into 
account such factors as “the age, relative maturity, ability to recall 
events, and psychological make-up of the child . . . when assessing 
the credibility of a claim,” the INS insists that the Guidelines “[do] 
                                                          
129 Id. 
130 Kristine K. Nogosek, It Takes A World To Raise A Child: A Legal and 
Public Policy Analysis of American Asylum Legal Standards and Their Impact 
on Unaccompanied Asylees, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 1 (2000) (arguing that the 
INS Guidelines do not afford children proper substantive protections under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act). 
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not create new law or alter existing law.”131 A child must still meet 
the refugee definition, therefore, in order for these factors to have a 
positive bearing on her claim.132 As a consequence, the INS 
Guidelines permit asylum officers very little discretion to ensure 
that these factors actually have an effect on the ultimate decision to 
grant or deny asylum to a child.133 
Unlike other types of adjudications, asylum proceedings 
present special challenges for applicants.134 In asylum proceedings, 
the applicant bears the burden of proof for establishing her 
eligibility for asylum.135 In most cases, the events at issue occurred 
far away, making it very difficult for applicants to secure the 
witnesses, documents, and other evidence crucial to their claims.136 
The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees has proposed that 
adjudicators account for these evidentiary challenges by affording 
the applicant the “benefit of the doubt.”137 This standard 
                                                          
131 INS Guidelines, supra note 80, at 17. 
132 Id. 
133 See id. at 18 (“Regardless of how sympathetic the child’s claim may be, 
he or she cannot be granted asylum unless the [Immigration and Nationality 
Act’s refugee definition] is met. Consequently, the ‘best interests of the child’ 
principle, while useful to the interview process, does not replace or change the 
refugee definition in determining substantive eligibility.”). See Bhabha & 
Young, supra note 53, at 97 n.52 (arguing that the Guidelines’ limitation of the 
best interests principle to procedural and evidentiary questions, and not the legal 
analysis of a child’s claim, is contrary to the CRC’s obligation on states to 
“protect and assist”). The UNHCR guidelines, in contrast, require that the best 
interests principle guide substantive eligibility determinations, as well as 
procedural and evidentiary matters. See supra Part II (discussing the UNHCR 
Guidelines). 
134 Id. 
135 MUSALO, supra note 24, at 869. The applicant bears both the burden of 
production of evidence as well as the burden of persuasion of the adjudicator. Id. 
136 Id. Governments that engage in persecution often go to great lengths to 
cover-up their commission of human rights violations. Id. As a result, it is often 
extremely difficult for asylum applicants to gain access to proof of their 
persecution. Id. 
137 UNHCR, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR 
DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 
PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, ¶¶ 196, 203-4 (1979). Some 
commentators have argued that Canada’s adjudication process incorporates the 
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recognizes that even after the applicant has made a “genuine 
effort” to corroborate her story there may still be a lack of evidence 
for some of her statements.138 Moreover, the High Commissioner 
recommends that adjudicators play an active role in facilitating the 
applicant’s “genuine effort” by sharing the applicant’s duty to 
evaluate and ascertain all the relevant evidence.139 Thus, although 
the burden of proof in principle remains with the applicant, the 
adjudicator also bears a responsibility to “use all the means at his 
disposal to produce the necessary evidence in support of the 
application.”140 
This approach is especially relevant for child applicants, who 
often lack the maturity to understand their role in the adjudicatory 
process and for whom it may be more difficult to present evidence 
with the same degree of consistency and precision as adults. A 
standard that eases the child’s burden of production, applies 
evidentiary rules flexibly, and affords the child the benefit of the 
doubt with respect to questions of credibility could significantly 
increase the likelihood that a child genuinely deserving of refuge 
will be granted asylum. Moreover, this standard would bring U.S. 
asylum law in closer conformance with international human rights 
norms pertaining to children as well as U.S. child welfare laws, 
which adopt the best interests principle as the standard that should 
be applied in all actions concerning children.141 
The policy that child applicants must meet the same 
substantive standard as adults cannot be reconciled with the INS 
Guidelines’ acknowledgement that, for child asylum seekers, “the 
balance between subjective fear and objective circumstances may 
                                                          
UNHCR’s “benefit of the doubt” standard. See Joanna Ruppel, The Need for a 
Benefit of the Doubt Standard in Credibility Evaluation of Asylum Applicants, 
23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.REV. 1, 34 (1991) (noting that a favorable decision by 
only one member of a two-member panel is required for an applicant to be 
granted asylum in Canada). 
138 UNHCR, supra note 137, at ¶ 203. 
139 UNHCR, supra note 137, at ¶ 196. 
140 UNHCR, supra note 137, at ¶ 196. 
141 See supra Part II (discussing the best interests of the child standard 
under international law). 
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be more difficult for an adjudicator to assess.”142 Children under 
sixteen years of age may “lack the maturity to form a well-founded 
fear of persecution . . . requiring the adjudicator to give more 
weight to objective factors.”143 Furthermore, adherence to the adult 
standard would not permit adjudicators to afford child claimants a 
“liberal application of the benefit of the doubt,” even though the 
Guidelines suggest that this may be necessary in certain 
circumstances.144 While the informal atmosphere of an asylum 
interview may provide sufficient opportunity for an asylum officer 
to meet the “challenging responsibility” of adjudicating a child’s 
claim, the INS Guidelines do not address the very different context 
of removal proceedings, which are far more formal and 
adversarial.145 
In many areas of U.S. law, including tort, contract, and 
                                                          
142 See supra Part III.A (discussing the rationale behind tailoring the 
asylum interview to the child’s age, maturity, background, and level of 
sophistication and the need for asylum officers to take these characteristics into 
account when adjudicating children’s claims). 
143 INS Guidelines, supra note 80, at 19. 
144 See id. at 20 (citing the need for asylum officers to afford a child 
applicant the benefit of the doubt where it is reasonable to believe the child’s 
parents possessed a well-founded fear of persecution prompting them to send the 
child outside the country, even though the precise circumstances of the child’s 
departure are not known). 
145 Bhabha & Young, supra note 53, at 121 (noting that the traditional 
courtroom environment was designed to inspire respect for the seriousness of 
the process, and, consequently, may intimidate children and prevent them from 
participating in the hearing). The removal proceedings are formal and 
adversarial particularly because they are conducted before a judge. Id. In some 
cases, detained child asylum seekers are brought before the immigration judge 
shackled and handcuffed. See Press Release, Amnesty International, First 
National Survey of Children in Immigration Detention Exposes Mistreatment, 
Lengthy Detentions, Legal Barriers (June 18, 2003), at http://www.amnesty 
usa.org/news/2003/usa06182003.html. The Unaccompanied Alien Child 
Protection Act of 2003 would require the EOIR to adopt the INS Guidelines in 
its handling of children’s asylum claims before immigration judges and the BIA. 
Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2003, S.1129, 108th Cong. § 
401(a) (2003). The bill also mandates that the Secretary of Homeland Security 
provide “periodic comprehensive training” on the Guidelines to all asylum 
officers, immigration judges, members of the BIA, and immigration officials 
who have contact with children. Id. § 401(b). 
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criminal law, a different legal standard is applied to children based 
on their status as a minor.146 The U.S. Supreme Court has 
acknowledged the special status of children under U.S. law, 
stating: 
Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition 
that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are 
less mature and responsible than adults. Particularly during 
the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors 
often lack the experience, perspective and judgment 
expected of adults.147 
Contract law and tort law afford children greater flexibility to 
protect them from the harsh penalties of the adult legal standard.148 
Underlying this grant of greater flexibility is the belief that 
children, due to their innate vulnerability and immaturity, should 
not be assumed to comprehend the impact and nature of their 
acts.149 Criminal law provides children with a separate court 
system and procedures, with the ultimate goal of rehabilitating 
children, not punishing them.150 
There is little, if any, evidence that the adoption of a more 
                                                          
146 Kristine K. Nogosek, It Takes A World To Raise A Child: A Legal and 
Public Policy Analysis of American Asylum Legal Standards and Their Impact 
on Unaccompanied Minor Asylees, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 1 (2000). 
147 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982) (finding that youth 
must be considered a relevant mitigating factor in sentencing sixteen year-old to 
death). 
148 Nogosek, supra note 146, at 14-16 (noting that the modern trend in the 
area of contract law is to hold the contract voidable upon the child’s option, and 
observing that under tort law, children are either completely immune from 
liability, or held to a more flexible legal standard of care that takes into account 
the child’s level of intelligence, maturity, and experience). 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 16 (noting that juvenile courts were based on the attitude that 
children were developmentally incomplete emotionally, morally, and 
cognitively, rendering them psychologically vulnerable). See LESLIE J. HARRIS, 
CHILDREN, PARENTS AND THE LAW: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN THE 
HOME, SCHOOLS, AND JUVENILE COURTS 317 (2002) (“The [juvenile] court’s 
process was conceived as informal, resembling the method by which parents 
deal with children in the home, rather than in terms of counsel, confrontation, 
and other characteristics of a criminal trial.”) 
BIENMACRO.DOC 4/23/2004  1:15 PM 
 CHILD ASYLUM SEEKERS 831 
flexible standard for children would result in a dramatic surge in 
children’s asylum claims in the United States.151 Even if more 
children are granted asylum in the United States under this 
standard, the U.S. will have taken seriously its humanitarian 
obligations toward the international community by assuming a 
larger share of responsibility for children affected by war and 
abuse. 
B. Recognizing the Forms of Persecution Unique to Children 
Neither the INS Guidelines nor the proposed Unaccompanied 
Child Protection Act address the forms of persecution unique to 
child applicants.152 For many child asylum seekers, the fact that 
they are children is central to their claim.153 Examples of cases in 
which the persecution alleged only applies to children include 
infanticide, female genital mutilation, bonded child labor, child 
marriage, and the sale of children.154 In other cases, behavior that 
might not rise to the level of persecution when targeted at adults 
may constitute persecution when children are the targets.155 For 
example, whereas U.S. asylum law currently views military 
conscription as a right of sovereign states, and thus not as a form of 
persecution, this adult-centered approach is insensitive to the 
situations of children fleeing forced military or guerilla 
conscription.156 Because children are more likely to be traumatized 
                                                          
151 See Ruppel, supra note 14, at 34 (arguing that, in 1988, the Canadian 
government incorporated into its refugee adjudication process the policy of 
affording the benefit of the doubt to all asylum applicants). Moreover, in 2002, 
Canada incorporated the best interests of the child principle into its Immigration 
and Protection Act. Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of 
Canada, U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/15/Add.215 (2003). Despite these provisions, individual claims by 
children still only account for five percent of all asylum applications lodged in 
Canada. Second Periodic Report of Canada, U.N. Committee on the Rights of 
the Child, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/83/Add.6 (2003). 
152 Bhabha & Young, supra note 53, at 103. 
153 Bhabha & Young, supra note 53, at 101. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 See supra text accompanying notes 2-9 (discussing Bernard Lukwago’s 
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by hostile situations due to their age, lack of maturity, and 
vulnerability, particular behaviors that would not constitute 
persecution for an adult, such as aggressive police questioning, 
threats, or physical abuse, may produce lasting damage, physical, 
or psychological trauma in a child that amounts to persecution.157 
Two recent cases involving the forced recruitment of children 
by military or guerilla forces reflect the difficulty courts face when 
confronted with such forms of persecution that do not fit neatly 
into current asylum doctrine. In Cruz-Diaz v. I.N.S., Carlos Cruz-
Diaz, a native of El Salvador who entered the U.S. illegally at the 
age of fifteen, sought reversal of the Bureau of Immigration 
Appeal’s (BIA) decision to deny him asylum.158 At his removal 
hearing, Cruz-Diaz testified that he feared persecution from the El 
Salvadorian army, which he believed had murdered members of 
his family, as well as guerillas from whom he had deserted.159 
Although the immigration judge found that Cruz-Diaz had proven 
his subjective fear of persecution, the judge denied his claim 
because under current asylum law, the army’s “hunt” for Cruz-
Diaz for fighting with the guerillas did not amount to 
persecution.160 On appeal, Cruz-Diaz argued that the immigration 
judge erred by holding him to the same standard as an adult who 
had evaded military conscription.161 The Fourth Circuit rejected 
this argument, finding no Congressional intent to apply a different 
standard to children’s asylum claims.162 Thus, it concluded that 
Cruz-Diaz was not entitled to special protection from the actions of 
the military on account of his youth, and the immigration judge 
appropriately treated his claim like that of “any other citizen of El 
Salvador who participated in or refused to participate in the 
                                                          
forced conscription and abuse by the LRA). Other situations in which children’s 
fundamental human rights are at issue include deprivation of education, 
heightened vulnerability following civil upheaval, homelessness, prostitution, 
and trafficking. Bhabha & Young, supra note 53, at 102-03. 
157 Bhabha & Young, supra note 53, at 104. 
158 Cruz-Diaz v. I.N.S., 86 F.3d 330 (4th Cir. 1996). 
159 Id. at 331. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 331. 
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activities of either the guerillas or the army.”163 
The Fourth Circuit also denied asylum to Rafael Garcia-Garcia, 
who, like Cruz-Diaz, entered the U.S. illegally from El Salvador.164 
At his removal hearing, Garcia-Garcia testified that when he was 
sixteen years-old, guerillas came to his home and threatened to kill 
him unless he joined their forces.165 After the guerillas forced him 
at gun-point to attack deserters with a baseball bat, Garcia-Garcia 
fled his captors while they were sleeping.166 Upon hearing from his 
father that the guerillas had come to his home looking for him, he 
fled El Salvador, fearing retaliation.167 Garcia-Garcia argued that 
his abduction and the violence he was forced to inflict on deserters 
constituted persecution, particularly in light of his age at the 
time.168 The Fourth Circuit rejected Garcia-Garcia’s argument, 
refusing to find that the forced recruitment of a child amounts to 
persecution.169 
These cases underscore the limitations of U.S. asylum policy, 
which fails to afford children substantive provisions that account 
for their status as children.170 As the definition of persecution 
continues to evolve, U.S. policymakers must craft asylum policies 
that are flexible enough to accommodate the range of situations 
from which people seek asylum.171 For example, in 1995, the INS 
                                                          
163 Id. at 332. 
164 Garcia-Garcia v. I.N.S., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4778, at *1 (4th Cir. 
Mar. 19, 1999). 
165 Id. at *2. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at *4. 
169 Id. See also, Perez-Garcia v. I.N.S., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 28522 (2nd 
Cir.1997) (finding that the Guatemalan military’s beating of a seventeen year-
old as a result of his refusal to join the army due to his status as a minor did not 
constitute persecution because a general requirement of military conscription is 
not persecution regardless of the “highhanded methods” employed by the 
Guatemalan military). See infra Part IV (discussing the justifications for 
reforming U.S. asylum policy to recognize the forced conscription of children as 
a form of persecution). 
170 Bhabha & Young, supra note 53, at 103. 
171 Id. The UNHCR handbook does not define the term persecution. 
Instead, it leaves its meaning open-ended in order to accommodate evolving 
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issued a memorandum recognizing that the refugee definition 
encompasses certain gender-related claims of women asylum 
seekers.172 In re Fauziya Kasinga, a case involving female genital 
mutilation, became the first BIA precedent decision to grant 
asylum to a woman based on gender persecution.173 In reaching its 
decision, the BIA carefully considered the context from which the 
claimant fled, her position within the society, and the social and 
political role of the practice of female genital mutilation within her 
culture.174 With growing recognition that gender-based violence 
constitutes a human rights violation, asylum policymakers have 
reinterpreted the concept of persecution expansively to protect 
victims from such abuse.175 Likewise, the concept of persecution 
                                                          
human rights norms. In response to changing social and political conditions in 
Africa, the Organization of African Unity extended the scope of the refugee 
definition under its 1969 refugee convention to all persons forced to flee across 
national borders due to “external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or 
events seriously disturbing public order . . . .” Convention Governing the 
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, June 20, 1974, art. 1(2), 1001 
U.N.T.S. 45. The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, adopted by ten Latin 
American states in 1984, embraced the OAU’s expanded definition by extending 
protection to “persons who have fled their country [because of] generalized 
violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, [or] massive violations of human 
rights . . . .” Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Nov. 22, 1984, ¶ 3, Annual 
Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OAS Doc. 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66/doc.10, rev. 1, at 190-93 (1984-85). 
172 Considerations For Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from 
Women (1995) (noting that an applicant’s gender may bear on her claim in 
significant ways, for instance, she may have been subjected to a form of 
persecution that disproportionately affects women, suffered persecution on 
account of her gender, or due to her membership in a particular social group 
constituted by women), available at http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/ 
law/guidelines.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2004). The memorandum identifies 
rape, and other forms of sexual violence, as well as the imposition of harsh rules 
on women, as examples of persecution primarily affecting women. Id. 
173 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA 1996). 
174 Pamela Goldberg, Asylum Law: Recent Developments on Gender Issues, 
8 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1507, n.7 (Sept. 2003). 
175 Considerations For Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from 
Women (1995) (citing evolving international human rights standards pertaining 
to women as providing the basis for the INS’s new approach to gender-related 
asylum claims). 
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must be expanded with regard to the forms of abuse child 
applicants commonly face in order to allow adjudicators to make 
meaningful distinctions between the claims of children and adults. 
C. The Exclusion Principle and Children 
The exclusion clause under the Refugee Convention, which 
bars certain categories of individuals from gaining asylum, does 
not distinguish between adults and children.176 In the United 
States, the subject of a bar against asylum first surfaced in 1948, 
regarding concern that former Nazis and their collaborators could 
attempt to use U.S. refugee protections to gain asylum.177 With the 
codification of the Refugee Convention’s definition of “refugee” 
under the 1980 Refugee Act, U.S. refugee law adopted the 
Convention’s exclusion from status as a refugee “any person who 
ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the 
persecution of any person” on account of their race, nationality, 
religion, political opinion, or membership in a particular social 
                                                          
176 See 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, supra note 24, at art. 1F. 
Article 1F of the Refugee Convention provides as follows: 
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with 
respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that: (a) he 
has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against 
humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make 
provision in respect of such crimes; (b) he has committed a serious 
non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission 
to that country as a refugee; (c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to 
the purposes of the United Nations. 
 Id. 
177 Creppy, supra note 23, at 444. The Displaced Persons Act was a U.S. 
immigration initiative created to assist in alleviating the problem of war refugees 
by temporarily raising quota limitations. Id. at 445. By deducting the increase in 
admitted refugees from future immigration numbers, the DPA facilitated the 
admission of over 400,000 displaced persons by 1951. Id. See The Displaced 
Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009, amended by Act of June 
16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219. The DPA specifically excluded from 
the definition of a displaced person, “any . . . person who can be shown . . . to 
have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of countries . . . or . . . 
to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forced since the outbreak of the second 
world war in their operations against the United Nations.” Id. 
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group.178 As military and guerilla leaders increasingly resort to 
forced conscription of children on a massive scale, however, the 
bright line that supposedly once separated persecutor from victim 
has blurred.179 
There is both domestic and international consensus that the law 
should treat children who have committed criminal acts differently 
than adults.180 Like other areas of U.S. refugee law, however, the 
exclusion clause does not distinguish children from adults.181 The 
situation of forcibly conscripted former child soldiers provides a 
stark example of the consequences of applying the exclusion 
clause to child applicants.182 
                                                          
178 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(42)(A) (2003). 
179 See Machel Report, supra note 54, at para. 34. According to the report, 
“Increasingly . . . adults are conscripting children as soldiers deliberately.” Id. 
180 See supra Part III.A (discussing how U.S. criminal law treats child 
offenders differently than adults); Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, July 17, 1998, art. 2, 37 I.L.M. 999 (entered into force 2002) [hereinafter 
ICC Statute] (exempting crimes committed by children under age eighteen from 
the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction). 
181 Michael Kingsley Nyinah, Exclusion Under Article 1F: Some 
Reflections on Context, Principles, and Practice, 12 INT’L. J. REFUGEE L. 295, 
308 (2000) (arguing for the need to “narrowly fashion the parameters of [the] 
exclusion [principle] so as to take due cognizance of [children’s] special 
status”). 
182 There are approximately 300,000 children serving as soldiers in current 
armed conflicts around the world. See Human Rights Watch, Stop the Use of 
Child Soldiers!, at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/index.htm (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2003) (providing detailed information on the use of child soldiers). 
Human rights groups have documented the widespread use of child soldiers in 
Angola, Colombia, Lebanon, Liberia, Sudan, and Uganda. Id. Most are 
adolescents, although many are younger than ten years of age. Machel Report, 
supra note 54, at § 35. Many are abducted from their families and forced to 
follow orders upon threat of death. Human Rights Watch, Stop the Use of Child 
Soldiers!, at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/index.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 
2003). Armed with AK-47s and M-16s, children are often positioned on the 
front lines of combat. Id. Some are forced to serve as human mine detectors or 
human shields. Id. Military and rebel forces often recruit young girls to serve as 
sex slaves. Machel Report, supra note 54, at § 45. In the civil war that ravaged 
Sierra Leone throughout the 1990s, rebel forces abducted thousands of children, 
some as young as five or six years-old, who witnessed and were forced to 
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Military and rebel recruiters prey upon children precisely 
because of their physical and psychological vulnerability.183 Child 
soldiers are more obedient, less likely to question orders, and 
easier to manipulate than adult soldiers.184 Furthermore, unlike 
their adult counterparts, children remain vulnerable even after 
hostilities have ceased.185 Many rebels refuse to release child 
soldiers to their families after the hostilities are over, while those 
who are released or escape often have no living family members to 
whom they can return.186 Some child soldiers fear retaliation by 
their former communities or former enemies for their perceived 
ties to the rebel forces.187 Former child soldiers, denied an 
                                                          
commit atrocities against civilians, including amputations, rape, and murder. 
Human Rights Watch, Stop the Use of Child Soldiers!, at 
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/index.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2003). In 
order to overcome their fear and resistance to fight, rebels forced children to 
ingest pure gunpowder, cocaine, and other drugs. Id. See also CNN Presents: 
Return to Freetown (CNN television broadcast, 2002). The filmmaker, Sourios 
Samura, interviewed Tamba and Sasko ten years after rebel forces abducted 
them from their families at ages eight and fifteen, respectively. Id. Tamba and 
Sasko described witnessing and participating in brutalities against innocent 
women and children. Id. While walking along a deserted battlefield, Tamba 
stopped at the place where he had participated in burning civilians alive. Id. 
When the filmmaker asked Tamba how he could have done such a horrendous 
act, the following exchange took place: 
TAMBA: [The rebels] gave us gunpowder and we ate it. They put some 
medicine in it and that gave us the mind to be able to kill. 
FILMMAKER: Didn’t you feel bad? 
TAMBA: No, because at the time the gunpowder was working on me. 
FILMMAKER: Today you are here, you know that you burned some 
bodies here and you came back here today. Tell me, what does it look 
like Tamba? 
TAMBA: May God forgive me. 
Id. 
183 Human Rights Watch, Stop the Use of Child Soldiers!, at http://www. 
hrw.org/campaigns/crp/index.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2003). 
184 Machel Report, supra note 54, § 34. 
185 Id. § 49. 
186 Id. § 52. 
187 Id. 
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education and the opportunity to learn civilian trades, are in 
tremendous need of assistance in gaining the skills necessary to 
reintegrate into peacetime society.188 
In response to the recruitment of children in conflicts 
throughout the 1990s, human rights activists, child advocates, and 
international humanitarian organizations embarked on a massive 
campaign to combat the use of child soldiers under the age of 
eighteen.189 Their advocacy culminated in the U.N. General 
Assembly’s unanimous adoption of the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict.190 Since its adoption in May 2000, 
more than one hundred nations have signed, and seventy nations 
have formally ratified the Protocol.191 On December 23, 2002, the 
United States became the forty-fifth country to ratify the 
                                                          
188 Human Rights Watch, Stop the Use of Child Soldiers!, at 
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/index.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2003). See 
also Machel Report, supra note 54, para. 56 (stressing the importance of 
education in preparing former child soldiers to find employment, facilitating 
their acceptance at home, and providing them with a sense of meaning and 
identity). 
189 See Human Rights Watch, The Child Soldiers Protocol, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/protocol.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2004). In 
1998, six non-governmental organizations formed the Coalition to Stop the Use 
of Child Soldiers. Human Rights Watch, Governments Urged to Stop the Use of 
Child Soldiers, available at http://www.hrw.org/press98/june/chil0701.htm (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2004). Existing international standards allowed for the legal 
recruitment of children as young as fifteen, while defining a child as any person 
below the age of eighteen. Id. Among other goals, the Coalition sought to 
correct this inconsistency. Id. 
190 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, May 25, 2000, G.A. Res. 54/263, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/ 
menu2/6/protocolchild.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2004) [hereinafter Child 
Soldiers Protocol]. 
191 See Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers website, at 
http://www.child-soldiers.org (providing updated information on the status of 
ratifications and signatures) (last visited Apr. 13, 2004). According to the 
Protocol, a country need only have signed the CRC to sign and ratify the 
Protocol. Child Soldiers Protocol, supra note 190, at art. 9. 
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Protocol.192 The Child Soldiers Protocol establishes eighteen as the 
minimum age for forced recruitment and direct participation in 
hostilities.193 While the Protocol does not speak directly to a state’s 
obligations vis-à-vis refugees who are former child soldiers, it calls 
upon states to implement programs aimed at the “physical and 
psychosocial rehabilitation and social reintegration of children who 
are the victims of armed conflict.”194 
In Liberia and Sierra Leone, where children were abducted and 
forcibly conscripted on a massive scale, the UNHCR looked to the 
CRC and the Child Soldiers Protocol rather than to exclusion 
practice in developing its policies toward former child soldiers.195 
These policies recognize that forced conscription represents a 
serious violation of children’s rights, and that children, due to their 
age, should not be held responsible as adult combatants.196 For 
example, whereas adult former combatants may not seek asylum 
until they have been demobilized and placed under observation for 
a period of time in an internment camp, former child soldiers are 
not interned, live with other refugees in a refugee camp, and may 
apply for asylum.197 The U.N.’s Machel study also emphasized that 
the use of child soldiers is a problem created by adults, which 
should be eradicated by adults.198 In addition, the treaty 
                                                          
192 Human Rights Watch, Stop the Use of Child Soldiers!, at 
http://hrw.org/campaigns/crp/protocol.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2003). 
193 Child Soldiers Protocol, supra note 190, at art. 1. In addition to 
prohibiting states from recruiting children under the age of eighteen into their 
armed forces, states are also required to take “all feasible measures” to prevent 
nongovernmental armed groups, such as guerilla and rebel forces, from 
recruiting children. Id. art. 4(2). See Michael Dennis, Newly Adopted Protocols 
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 94 A.J.I.L. 789, 793 (2000) 
(discussing the obligation on states parties to the Protocol to take “all feasible 
measures” to prevent the recruitment of children under the age of eighteen, 
including by the enactment of legislation to ensure that such recruitment is 
punishable as a criminal offense under their national law). 
194 Child Soldiers Protocol, supra note 190, at art. 6(3). 
195 Press Release, UNHCR, Liberia’s Child Soldiers Relive Lost Childhood 
in Sierra Leone (Feb. 12, 2003) (on file with author). 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 Machel Report, supra note 54, at §§ 25 and 30. 
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establishing the International Criminal Court makes the 
recruitment of children under age fifteen a war crime.199 
Recognizing that child soldiers are victims first and foremost, the 
ICC statute shields children under the age of eighteen from 
prosecution.200 
While there are important policy reasons for prohibiting 
individuals who voluntarily commit serious crimes from enjoying 
the benefits of asylum, these policies, which serve to prohibit 
former Nazis and other perpetrators of serious crimes from seeking 
refuge in this country, were not intended, nor should they be 
extended, to exclude children.201 To apply the bar to former child 
soldiers like Bernard Lukwago would fly in the face of the positive 
work that U.S. policymakers and the international community have 
undertaken to address this pernicious form of child abuse. 
CONCLUSION 
The growing international consensus that child asylum seekers 
require special protections has important implications for U.S. 
asylum laws. Although the U.S. asylum system currently does not 
differentiate between adult and child applicants, the United States 
should build on recent proposals to afford greater procedural 
protections to child asylum seekers with substantive provisions that 
address the forms of persecution unique to children. With millions 
of children suffering from the consequences of armed conflicts 
around the world, the international community has a special legal 
and moral obligation to ensure that child asylum seekers receive 
adequate care and protection. As this record of violence makes 
clear, a world unwilling to protect children is one in which 
“children are slaughtered, raped, and maimed . . . exploited as 
soldiers . . . starved and exposed to extreme brutality.”202 In short, 
it is a world devoid of the most basic of human values. The United 
States has an important role to play in ensuring that children who 
                                                          
199 See ICC Statute, supra note 180. 
200 Id. art. 26. 
201 Nyinah, supra note 181, at 308. 
202 Machel Report, supra note 54, at § 3. 
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escape such turmoil are properly protected. 
 
